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Abstract
In experiments which measure subjects’ beliefs, both beliefs about others’
behavior and beliefs about others’ beliefs, are often correlated with a sub-
ject’s own choices. Such phenomena have been interpreted as evidence of a
causal relationship between beliefs and behavior. An alternative explanation
attributes them to what psychologists refer to as a ‘false consensus effect.’ It
is my impression that the latter explanation is often prematurely dismissed
because it is thought to be based on an implausible psychological bias. The
goal of this note is to show that the false consensus effect does not rely on
such a bias. I demonstrate that rational belief formation implies a correla-
tion of behavior and beliefs of all orders whenever behaviorally relevant traits
are drawn from an unknown common distribution. Thus, if we assume that
subjects rationally update beliefs, correlations of beliefs and behavior cannot
support a causal relationship.
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1 Introduction
My aim in this short note is to demonstrate that experimental economists should be
careful when lending a causal interpretation to observed correlations of beliefs and
behavior. An alternative interpretation of such a correlation is what psychologists
refer to as the ‘false consensus effect’: People may systematically over-estimate the
extent to which others behave and think as they do.
Most papers investigating ostensibly causal relationships between beliefs and be-
havior typically mention the false consensus effect as a potentially confounding fac-
tor. However, it is my impression that many authors do not consider it a major
concern. A possible reason is that many experimental and behavioral economists
think that a false consensus effect would have to be based on a rare psychological
bias, and therefore the problem may be safe to ignore.1 This short note demon-
strates, using a simple model, that this is wrong. The correlations of beliefs and
behavior that are conventionally referred to as a false consensus effect do not require
any kind of psychological bias.
The basic argument is the following. If traits relevant to behavior are shared
(formally, correlated), a rational agent should use his own inclinations to predict the
behavior of others, his own beliefs to predict the beliefs of others, and so forth, up to
arbitrary orders of belief. Absent additional information, it makes sense for people
to hypothesize that others behave and think as they do, and (as a consequence) that
others expect them to behave exactly as they do.
To illustrate the argument informally, imagine two tourists in an exotic country
being offered the choice between two previously unfamiliar foods A and B. After
inspecting the choices, the first tourist feels inclined to choose A. Now imagine
asking him ‘what do you think the other tourist will choose?’ Then it is perfectly
rational for the first tourist to think ‘Well, I think A looks better, and he’s probably
similar to me, so I guess he will feel the same.’ And indeed it is rational to conclude
1Readers familiar with the experimental literature on Psychological Game Theory will recognize
what I am talking about. However I will deliberately refrain from citing specific sources here.
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that the other tourist probably expects him to choose A as well, and to believe that
the other tourist believes that he (tourist 1) expects him (tourist 2) to choose A,
etc. ad infinitum.
It has been brought to my attention that part of the argument I am developing
here was already presented in Dawes (1989). Indeed Dawes argued in essentially the
same way that it is rational for an individual to use her own (binary) response to
a task as an estimator of the average response in a population of which she herself
is a member. While this is the essential ingredient in the arguments made below,
my analysis will go slightly further in that I will show that rational belief formation
will lead to correlations of behavior and beliefs of any order. In addition, I will
explicitly consider how this phenomenon affects our ability to experimentally test
theories using treament parameters. In particular, I will show that the experimenter
may falsely attribute treatment effects to changes in (higher order) beliefs when if
fact they are directly related to the treatment parameter.
2 Model
Consider a world with two states labeled θ ∈ {θL, θH}, both equally likely. There
are N ≥ 2 players, who each have two available actions, aL and aH . Each player i
receives a private signal si ∈ {sL, sH}. In state θK , the probability that si = sK is
equal to p > 1
2
. Thus, each agent’s private signal is correlated with the state of the
world, which is common to all agents. Assume that behavior is entirely determined
by an agent’s signal. Specifically, when si = sK , agent i takes action aK .
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By construction, behavior in this example is not a function of an agent’s second
order beliefs. None the less, it is easy to show that second order beliefs will be
perfectly correlated with behavior. To see this, note first that a player who receives
2The signal can be interpreted in any number of ways. It may reflect a player’s type in terms of
intrinsic motivations to choose an action, or it may reflect information concerning the state of the
world, on which action preferences depend. What’s important is that the signal causes the agent
to behave in one way or the other.
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signal sK attaches probability
1
2
p
1
2
p+ 1
2
(1−p) = p >
1
2
to state θK . Thus, the posterior
probability that another agent j 6= i receives the same signal sK is given by q =
p2 + (1− p)2 > 1
2
.
It follows that an agent who receives signal sK first order believes that another
agent will take action aK with probability µ
1(aK |sK) = q > 12 . Now consider agent
i’s second order beliefs after receiving signal sK . With probability q, agent j 6= i
receives the same signal sK and (first order) believes that agent i will take action
aK with probability µ
1(aK |sK) = q. With probability (1 − q), agent j receives
signal s−K and believes that i will take action aK with probability µ1(aK |s−K) =
(1 − q). Thus i second order believes that j attaches, in expectation, a probability
µ2(aK |sK) = q2+(1−q)2 > 12 to her (i) choosing action aK . Similarly, i believes that,
in expectation, j attaches probability µ2(a−K |sK) = 2 · q · (1− q) = 1− µ2(aK |sK)
to her choosing action a−K .3
Now, consider what will happen in state θK . Suppose that we can observe be-
havior as well as (mean) second order beliefs concerning the probability of choosing
action aK . Clearly, an expected fraction p of all agents will choose action aK and
have second order beliefs µ2(aK |sK) > 12 . Conversely, an expected fraction (1 − p)
of all agents will choose action a−K and have second order beliefs µ2(aK |s−K) < 12 .
Thus, behavior will be perfectly correlated with second order beliefs even though it
is causally determined only by the si.
This example shows that a rational agent’s second order beliefs will tend to be
correlated with her behavior if private factors relevant to choice (e.g. preferences) are
correlated across agents. Thus, if experimental subjects believe that other subjects’
private preferences and inclinations are similar to their own, we should expect to see
a correlation of second order beliefs and behavior in any experimental setting, even
if behavior is driven by other factors. It is immediately obvious that the argument
can be extended to yield the same conclusion for beliefs of any order.
3With probability q, agent j believes that i will choose a−K with probability (1 − q). With
probability (1− q), j attaches probability q to this event.
3
3 Extension: Treatment effects
This example can be expanded to discuss the effects of a treatment variable on
beliefs and behavior. In addition to the private signals si, all agents now observe a
public signal t ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose that this signal directly affects the behavior of some
subjects. If t = 0, behavior is determined as before. If t = 1, a fraction r ∈ (0, 1]
of all agents prefers action aH , irrespective of their private signal. The remaining
‘flexible’ agents behave as before.
When t = 0, beliefs are determined as above. What happens to beliefs when
t = 1? An agent that receives signal sH will first order believe that others will
choose action aH with probability µ˜
1(aH |sH) = r + (1− r) · q > q = µ1(aH |sH). An
agent who receives signal sL will first order believe that others will choose action aH
with probability µ˜1(aH |sL) = r + (1− r) · (1− q) > (1− q) = µ1(aH |sL). An agent
who receives signal sK will second order believe that another agent’s first order belief
is given by µ˜1(aH |sK) with probability q, and µ˜1(aH |s−K) with probability (1− q).
In expectation, she believes that another agent attaches probability µ˜2(aH |sK) =
q · µ˜1(aH |sK) + (1 − q) · µ˜1(aH |s−K) > µ2(aH |sK) to the event that she will choose
action aH . Thus, both first and second order beliefs of all agents will put more
weight on action aH under the treatment condition.
Again, we can consider what would happen if we were to observe behavior and
beliefs in this setting. Clearly, nothing changes relative to the previous example
when t = 0. When t = 1 and θ = θH , an expected fraction p + r · (1 − p) of
all agents will choose action aH . (All those who receive signal sH , plus those who
receive signal sL, but are sensitive to the treatment.) Among these agents, the mean
second order belief will be β (aH , θH) =
p·µ˜2(aH |sH)+r·(1−p)·µ˜2(aH |sL)
p+r·(1−p) . When θ = θL, an
expected fraction (1 − p) + r · p will choose action aH , and the mean second order
belief among these agents will be β (aH , θL) =
(1−p)·µ˜2(aH |sH)+r·p·µ˜2(aH |sL)
(1−p)+r·p . Among
those choosing aL, the mean second order belief associated with action aH is equal
to β (aL, θK) = µ˜
2(aH |sL).
Relative to the baseline condition t = 0, the treatment condition t = 1 causes
the expected fraction of subjects choosing action aH to increase by r · (1− p) when
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θ = θH , and by r · p when θ = θL. Further, β (aH , θK) > β (aL, θK) for K = L,H.
That is, subjects choosing action aH will have ‘higher’ second order beliefs than
those choosing action aL.
Thus, the data will have the following features: (1) beliefs and behavior are corre-
lated within each of the treatment conditions (2) second order beliefs are correlated
with the treatment condition, and (3) behavior is correlated with the treatment
condition. Despite the fact that behavior is directly affected by the treatment signal
t, these features are consistent with the false hypothesis that behavior is causally
driven by second order beliefs. If follows that data of this type cannot be used to
support that hypothesis.
4 Conclusion
The simple model presented in this short note suggests that a rational agent’s be-
havior may be perfectly correlated with his beliefs (of any order) even in a setting
where beliefs do not causally affect behavior. The essential feature of the setting
considered is that the behavior of agents belonging to a relevant reference group is
determined by some individual characteristic which is drawn from the same (un-
known) distribution. Substantively, this means that the members of the reference
group are expected to be similar.
This assumption is natural and plausible in almost any application, including
experimental games. When faced with an experimental decision task, an individual
participant will feels a disposition to choose a certain option. This disposition reflects
genetic, cultural, and other factors that make certain choices appear attractive or
appropriate. Although these factors are likely to vary between individuals, it is
reasonable for a subject to assume that they will be correlated within a reference
group (typically, students of the same university).
If I sample an exotic food and find it delicious, it is reasonable for me to think
that other members of my reference group are similarly disposed, and therefore I
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should expect that others will also find the food delicious. And indeed this logic can
be extended to higher order beliefs, for example I should expect others to predict
that I will find the food delicious, and to believe that I will predict the same about
them, etc. ad infinitum
Since all of this is true when agents update their beliefs rationally, the phe-
nomenon conventionally referred to as the ‘false consensus effect’ does not represent
a psychological bias. This suggests that it should be taken seriously. If so, it rep-
resents a serious challenge to researchers attempting to test theories that stipulate
direct effects of (higher order) beliefs on motivation and behavior. In particular, it
is not the case that such theories can be supported by data that demonstrates a
correlation of beliefs and behavior, be it within or between treatments (or both).
One way to test such theories would be to induce transparently exogenous varia-
tion in beliefs using treatment variables that affect only beliefs but not other factors
relevant to a subject’s choices. And a way to test theories stipulating a direct effect
of a treatment condition (not via beliefs) is to induce exogenous variation in the
treamtent condition while holding beliefs constant.4
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